Nowadays, remote user authentication protocol plays a great role in ensuring the security of data transmission and protecting the privacy of users for various network services. In this study, we discover two recently introduced anonymous authentication schemes are not as secure as they claimed, by demonstrating they suffer from offline password guessing attack, desynchronization attack, session key disclosure attack, failure to achieve user anonymity, or forward secrecy. Besides, we reveal two environment-specific authentication schemes have weaknesses like impersonation attack. To eliminate the security vulnerabilities of existing schemes, we propose an improved authentication scheme based on elliptic curve cryptosystem. We use BAN logic and heuristic analysis to prove our scheme provides perfect security attributes and is resistant to known attacks. In addition, the security and performance comparison show that our scheme is superior with better security and low computation and communication cost.
Introduction
With the dramatic increase of network attacks and privacy leakage, it is extremely important for various network services to identify the authenticity of communicating party and protect the privacy of users in insecure environment. As a basic defense strategy for numerous network services, the authentication protocol is aimed at solving these security issues. It has been used in various areas, such as e-banking, ehealth, wireless sensor networks, and internet of things [1] [2] [3] . Authentication protocol generally provides three useful functionalities, that is, mutual authentication, user anonymity, and session key agreement.
Recently, there have been a great number of authentication schemes introduced and some evaluation metrics developed [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . In 2012, Wang et al. [9] presented a robust authentication protocol that is resistant to known attacks, but the protocol has low efficiency, as it requires a number of modular exponentiation operations. Besides, they presented a comprehensive evaluation criteria for smart card based password authentication protocols. Madhusudhan and Mittal [10] defined the security requirements and desirable properties an authentication protocol should fulfil and provide. Kim-Kim [11] introduced an efficient dynamic identity authentication scheme, in which a synchronization mechanism is adopted to achieve user anonymity. In 2014, Islam et al. [12] introduced an anonymous authentication scheme based on elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC). Huang et al. [13] proposed an anonymous authentication protocol based on RSA cryptosystem. In 2015, Wang et al. [14] demonstrated Kim-Kim's scheme and its similar schemes that employ the same synchronization mechanism cannot withstand desynchronization attack and introduced an ElGamal cryptosystem based scheme to overcome this threat. In 2016, Nikooghadam et al. [15] presented an efficient authentication protocol using symmetric key cryptosystem and claimed the protocol is resistant to various known attacks. Jung et al. [16] proposed a symmetric key cryptosystem based authentication and key agreement protocol for wireless sensor networks. In 2017, Luo et al. [17] proved that Islam et al. 's scheme is susceptible to insider attack and offline password guessing attack and introduced a new ECC-based scheme for improvement. But their scheme suffers from session key disclosure attack and offline guessing password attack. Xiong et al. [18] proved Jung et al. 's protocol fails to achieve forward secrecy and suffers from smart card loss attack and introduced an improved scheme based on hash chain technique. Xie et al. [19] proposed a provably secure authentication protocol using 2 Security and Communication Networks ECC. Unfortunately, the protocol is inefficient in detection of wrong identity and password. Amin et al. [20] demonstrated that Huang et al. 's scheme cannot resist offline password guessing attack and forgery attack and presented an anonymous RSA cryptosystem based scheme for improvement.
Although a great number of research works have been done on authentication protocols [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] , new authentication schemes still have various security weaknesses [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [32] [33] [34] . Offline guessing password attack and forward secrecy attack are two of the most common security weaknesses.
One prominent issue of authentication protocol is security against offline guessing password attack. In authentication scheme, the verification value is essential to check the validity of inputted password and implement local password updates. But the introduced verification value probably leads to offline password guessing attack, even server impersonation attack, user impersonation attack, and man-in-themiddle attack. To solve this problem, Wang et al. [35] introduced an effective solution by integrating "fuzzy-verifier" with "honeywords".
On the other hand, forward secrecy is a matter of concern to authentication protocol. Numerous authentication schemes proposed recently achieve many desirable features but fail to preserve forward secrecy. Forward secrecy attack is a security vulnerability that damages the whole server system. Halevi and Krawczyk [36] demonstrated that, for any key exchange scheme, perfect forward secrecy can be achieved through using Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
Our Contributions.
We cryptanalyze several representative schemes in the paper. Firstly, we point out Amin et al. 's scheme [20] suffers from offline guessing attack, user impersonation attack and fails to provide forward secrecy. Next, we reveal Nikooghadam et al. 's protocol [15] suffers from offline guessing attack, man-in-the-middle attack, session key disclosure attack, server impersonation attack, desynchronization attack, user impersonation attack, and fails to preserve forward secrecy and user anonymity. Then we point out Mishra et al. 's session initiation protocol [33] fails to provide forward secrecy. In addition, we demonstrate Hsieh et al. 's authentication scheme for wireless communication [34] suffers from offline password guessing attack and impersonation attack.
To eliminate these security vulnerabilities, we propose an improved authentication protocol based on elliptic curve cryptosystem. We use BAN logic and informal analysis to prove the completeness and security of our scheme. Furthermore, we give the performance and security comparison of related schemes. The results show that our scheme is more practical. gives the proposed scheme. Section 6 is the security analysis of our scheme. And Section 7 gives the security and performance comparison of related schemes. Section 8 is a conclusion. We elaborate the notations of this paper in Table 1 .
Cryptanalysis of Amin Et Al.'s Scheme
In this section, we describe Amin et al. 's scheme and reveal its security vulnerabilities.
Review of Amin Et
Al. 's Scheme. Amin et al. 's scheme consists of the following three phases (see Figure 1 ).
Initialization
Phase. S chooses two big prime numbers u, v and calculates = × V. Next, S selects another prime number , where 1 < < ( − 1)(V − 1). And d is calculated according to ≡ 1 mod( − 1)(V − 1). S publishes public parameters { , } and keeps { , , V} as secret.
Registration Phase.
In this phase, submits his identity information to S with the purpose of obtaining the access permission.
Step 1.
picks and freely. calculates = ℎ( ‖ ), where is a nonce. Afterwards, { , } is transmitted to S via a secure channel.
Step 2. Upon receiving { ,
Chooses a random number N 1
Chooses a random number N 2 S stores { , , , } in a smart card. The smart card is transmitted to via a secure channel.
Step 3.
stores in the smart card.
Login and Authentication
Phase. In this phase, delivers a login request message to . verifies the legitimacy of the message and sends back a response.
Step 1. attaches the smart card to a terminal and inputs * and * . The smart card calculates * = ℎ( * ‖ ), * = ⊕ ℎ( * ‖ * ), * = ℎ( * ‖ * ‖ * ), and checks whether * = . If the equation holds, perform next step.
Step 2. The smart card computes = ℎ( * ‖ ℎ( * ‖ * ) ‖ ‖ 1 ), = ( * ‖ ‖ 1 ) mod , where 1 is random number. { , , } is transmitted to S.
Step 3. After receiving { , , }, S validates if − < û , where is the current time receives { , , } at server end, and û is an accredited maximum transport delay. If it holds, it denotes that is fresh. S computes mod to derive
Step 4. S calculates = ℎ( ‖ [ℎ( * ‖ * )] ‖ ‖ 1 ) and checks t . If the equation holds, S regards as a legitimate user. Otherwise, this protocol aborts.
Step 5. S computes = ℎ( 2 ‖ ),
, where 2 is a random number. S sends { , , } to .
Step 6. After receiving { , , }, the smart card first checks if is fresh. Next, the smart card calculates 2 = ⊕ 1 , = ℎ( 2 ‖ * ), and checks if t . If the equation holds, S is authenticated by . Then, the smart card calculates = ℎ( 1 ‖ * ‖ 2 ) as session key.
Cryptanalysis of Amin Et
Al. 's Scheme. In this part, we elaborate Amin et al. 's scheme is susceptible to several security attacks.
Offline Password Guessing
Attack. The adversary A extracts { , , , , } from the smart card. A performs offline password guessing attack in the following steps.
Step 1. Choose an identity * from the identity dictionary space, and a password * from the password dictionary space.
Step 2. Calculate * = ℎ( * ‖ ), * = ⊕ ℎ( * ‖ * ), * = ℎ( * ‖ * ‖ * ). Compare * with . If they are equal, it shows that * is 's real identity, and * is 's correct password.
Step 3. Repeat Steps 1-2, until A finds the real and .
User Impersonation Attack.
Once A extracts { , , , , } from the smart card and gets , via "offline password guessing attack", A performs user impersonation attack in the following steps.
Obviously, * is equal to .
Step 2. Select a nonce 1 
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Chooses a random number RN i Step 3. Upon receiving { , , }, as is fresh, S computes mod to retrieve ( ‖ ‖ 1 ). Then S computes
As is equal to , S regards A as legitimate user .
The inherent reason for above attacks is that there is a verification value in smart card for the adversary to check if the guessed and are correct.
Forward Secrecy. Suppose
A gets the secret key { , , V} and intercepts message { , , } and { , , } from public channel. Then A calculates the session key as follows.
Step 1. Compute mod to derive ( ‖ ‖ 1 ).
Step 2.
Step
In Amin et al. 's scheme, and S select random numbers 1 , 2 , respectively. The transmission of 1 uses RSA encryption under the public key of S. The transmission of 2 uses bitwise XOR with 1 . Hence, the confidentiality of random numbers is completely dependent on the private key of S. Once the private key of S is compromised, the attacker can easily get all session keys of the whole server system.
Cryptanalysis of Nikooghadam Et Al.'s Scheme
In this section, we review Nikooghadam et al. 's scheme and reveal its security vulnerabilities. Figure 2 ).
Registration Phase.
In this phase, when receiving the enrollment request, issues a smart card to .
Step 1. picks , freely. Then calculates = ℎ( ‖ ‖ ), where is a random number. { , } is transmitted to through a secure channel.
Step 2. After receiving { ,
where is a random number. stores { , , (⋅)/ (⋅)} in a smart card and delivers it to through a secure channel.
Login and Authentication
Phase. This phase verifies the legitimacy of communicating parties and negotiates a session key.
Step 1. inserts his smart card into a terminal and enters * , * . The smart card calculates Step 1. Choose an identity * from the identity dictionary space and a password * from the password dictionary space.
Step 2. Calculate * = ⊕ ℎ( * ‖ ‖ * ), ( * * ‖ * ‖ * ‖ * ) = * ( ). Check * t , * t . If both the two equations hold, it shows that * is 's real identity, and * is 's correct password.
Step 3. Repeat Steps 1-2, until A find real and .
User Anonymity.
For the message { , , }, is compromised by performing offline password guessing attack; this is violation of user anonymity.
Once the adversary A gets { , , (⋅)/ (⋅), } and obtains and by performing offline password guessing attack and intercepts { , , }, { }, and { } from pubic channel, A performs user impersonation attack, server impersonation attack, man-in-the-middle attack, session key disclosure attack, and desynchronization attack as follows.
User Impersonation Attack.
Step 1. A computes = ⊕ ℎ( ‖ ‖ ).
is a nonce, and is current timestamp. A sends { , , } to S.
Step 3. After S receiving { , , }, as is fresh, = , = , S regards A as the legitimate user and returns { } to A. Step 5. After S receiving { }, as = , S computes = ℎ( ‖ ‖ ). A establishes a session key with S successfully.
Server Impersonation Attack.
Step 1. Compute = ⊕ ℎ( ‖ ‖ ).
Step 2. Compute ( ‖ ‖ ‖ ) = ( ).
Step 3. Intercept { } from public channel. Generate a nonce and select a binary string whose length is the same as . Compute = ( ‖ ‖ ‖ ) and return { } to .
Step 4. After receiving { }, as = , = , regards A as the sever S.
Man-in-the-Middle Attack.
Step 1. Intercept { , , } from public channel and send { , , } to S.
Step 2. Intercept { } from public channel and send { } to .
Step 3. Intercept { } from public channel and send { } to S.
Session Key Disclosure Attack.
Step 1. Calculate = ⊕ ℎ( ‖ ‖ ).
Step 2. Calculate ( ‖ ‖ ‖ ) = ( ).
Step 3. Calculate = ℎ( ‖ ‖ ).
Desynchronization Attack.
Step Step 1. Calculate = ( ).
Step 2. Calculate = ℎ( ‖ ).
Step 3. Calculate ( ‖ ‖ ‖ ) = ( ).
Step 4. Calculate = ℎ( ‖ ‖ ).
The transmission of random numbers , uses symmetric encryption under key . The confidentiality of random numbers is dependent on the authentication value . Once the master key of S is leaked, the attacker is able to compute = ℎ( ‖ ) and obtain , by decrypting message { }. Consequently, the session keys of the whole sever system are compromised.
In the authentication scheme, random numbers are essential to establish unique session key in each session. If the user or server cannot transmit random number to the other side securely, it certainly will compromise the session key.
Cryptanalysis of Two Authentication Schemes for Specific Environment
Recently, Mishra et al. presented an efficient authentication scheme for session initiation protocol. In addition, Hsieh et al. introduced an authentication scheme for wireless communication. However, after a rigorous analysis, we discover both the two schemes have vulnerabilities. We reveal the weaknesses of the two schemes in this section.
Review of Mishra Et
Al. 's Scheme. We briefly review Mishra et al. 's scheme in this subsection. As the password and biometric update phase is irrelevant to our cryptanalysis, we omit it.
Registration Phase.
Step 1. picks , at will and computes = ℎ( ‖ ‖ ), where is a nonce. delivers { , } to the server S securely.
Step 2. Upon receiving { , }, computes = ℎ( ‖ ‖ ), = ⊕ , where is the secret key of S, and is the number of times the user once registered with S. S sends a smart card storing { , } to .
Step 3. imprints his biometric . The smart card computes = ℎ( ‖ ‖ ℎ( )), = ℎ( ) ⊕ , and stores , in its memory.
Login and Authentication Phase.
Step 1. enters * , * and imprints * . The smart card checks if = ℎ( * ‖ * ‖ ℎ( * )). If it holds, the smart card calculates = ℎ( * ) ⊕ ,
Step 2. After receiving the message, S computes
Step 3. After receiving { 2 , 3 }, the smart card calculates = ℎ(
). If 2 = 2 , regards he establishes a valid session key with S.
Weaknesses of Mishra Et Al. 's Scheme

Forward Secrecy.
In the case that the adversary A obtains the secret key and intercepts the messages { , 1 , , 1 } and { 2 , 3 } from public channel, then A is able to breach the session key in the following steps.
Step 1. Compute = ⊕ ℎ(( • ) ).
Step 2. Let = 0.
Step 3. Compute = ℎ( ‖ ‖ ), 1 = ℎ( ‖ ‖ ℎ(( • ) )) ‖ ( ) ‖ 1 ).
Step 4. Check if 1 = 1 . If they are equal, proceed next step. Otherwise, let = + 1, and go to Step 3.
Step 5. Compute the session key = ℎ( ‖ ‖ ( • ) ) ‖ 1 ‖ 3 ).
Review of Hsieh Et
Al. 's Scheme. We briefly review Hsieh et al. 's scheme in this subsection. As the ticket authentication phase is irrelevant to our cryptanalysis, we omit it.
Registration Phase.
Step 1. The mobile station MS delivers { , } to the home agent HA securely.
Step 2. After receiving the registration request, HA computes
where , are the secret values of HA, and 1 , 2 are two random numbers. HA issues a smart card storing { , 3 , , , 4 } to MS.
Ticket-Issuing Phase.
, 1 are random numbers. MS sends { , 5 , , } to the foreign agent FA.
Step 2. After receiving the message, FA computes 2 = , = ( , 1 , 2 ), where k is a secret key shared by FA and HA. FA delivers { , 5 , , , } to HA.
Step 3. After receiving the message, HA
Step 4. Upon receiving { 1 , 2 , }, computes ( 3 ,
Step 5. Step 1. A picks a password * from the password dictionary space.
If it holds, it shows that * is the correct password.
Step 3. Repeat Steps 1-2, until A finds .
MS Impersonation Attack.
In the case that smart card is compromised, the adversary is able to obtain the password via offline password guessing attack; that is to say, the adversary has acquired all the authentication information that MS has. The capability of adversary has no differences with the legitimate MS. Hence, the adversary is able to impersonate and defraud and successfully.
HA Impersonation Attack.
A intercepts the message { , 5 , , } from public channel. With the smart card and , A is able to perform impersonation attack in the following steps.
where is a random number. A sends { 1 , 2 , } to .
Step 2. After receiving { 1 , 2 , }, MS computes 4 = ℎ(ℎ( ‖ ) ‖ 1 ) ⊕ 1 , 2 = ℎ(ℎ( ‖ ) ‖ 1 ‖ 4 ). As 2 = 2 , MS computes = 4 , = ( ). MS believes that it establishes a session key with HA.
Proposed Scheme
To overcome the weaknesses of Amin et al. 's scheme and Nikooghadam et al. 's scheme, we propose an improved anonymous authentication protocol using ECC. The proposed scheme establishes secure session key based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Our scheme consists of the following four phases (see Figure 3 ).
Initialization Phase. S chooses an elliptic curve group .
is a generator of . Then, S chooses a random number x as its private key and calculates = as its public key. S publishes { , , } and keeps x as secret.
Registration Phase.
In this phase, when receiving a registration request, issues a smart card containing the parameters for user authentication to .
Step 1. picks and freely. calculates = ℎ( ⊕ ), where is a random number. Afterwards, { , } is transmitted to S via a secure channel.
Step 2. After receiving { , }, S calculates = ℎ( ‖ ), = ⊕ , = ℎ( ‖ )mod , where 2 4 ≤ ≪ 2 8 . stores { , , (⋅), , , , } in a smart card and transmits it to through a secure communication channel.
Login and Authentication
Phase. This phase verifies the authenticity of communicating parties and generates a session key.
Step 1. attaches his smart card to a terminal and inputs * and * . Then the smart card calculates * = ℎ( * ⊕ ), * = ℎ( * ‖ * )mod , and checks * t . If the equation holds, the smart card computes 
Stores r i into smart card
Stores B i , V i , E Key (·) , E p , P, P pub , n in a smart card
Chooses a random number N 2 Computes Z i = N 2 P, Step 4. After receiving { }, S computes = ℎ( ‖ ‖ ) and checks t . If the equation holds, S establishes a session key with successfully.
Password Updates Phase.
updates his original password to a new one as follows.
attaches his smart card to a terminal and inputs * and * . The smart card calculates * = ℎ( * ⊕ ), * = ℎ( * ‖ * )mod , and checks * t . If it holds, the smart card asks the user to input a new password.
enters his new password . Then the smart card calculates = ⊕ * ⊕ ℎ( ⊕ ), = ℎ(ℎ( ⊕ ) ‖ * )mod . The smart card deletes , and stores , in its memory.
Security Analysis
6.1. Informal Analysis. The heuristic analysis shows that our scheme can withstand various known attacks.
Offline Password Guessing
Attack. Suppose that the adversary A steals the smart card of and extracts { , , (⋅), , , , , } from it; then A executes the following steps.
Step 1. Choose an identity * from identity dictionary space and a password * from password dictionary space.
Step 2. Compute * = ℎ( * ⊕ ), * = ℎ( * ‖ * )mod .
Step 3. Check * t .
In our scheme, we employ the verification value * = ℎ( * ‖ * )mod . When = 2 8 and the identity and password are 64 bits, there are (2 64 * 2 64 )/2 8 pairs of < * , * > conforming to * = . Even if A finds a pair of < * , * > that conforms to * = , the probability they are equal to the identity and password of is 2 8 /(2 64 * 2 64 ).
Our scheme overcomes the offline password guessing attack at a cost of false acceptance rate of 1/2 8 . But it does not compromise the security. When the server receives a login request message generated with erroneous < * , * >, as ̸ = , the server rejects the login request.
Replay Attack.
Suppose that the adversary A tries to launch replay attack in the following cases.
In the case that the adversary A intercepts { , } from public channel and replays the message to S, S handles the message and returns { , } to A. However, without 1 and , A is unable to generate a valid { }. The protocol finally aborts.
In the case that A replays message { , } or { }. Both the two messages are generated based on the random numbers 1 and 2 . The random numbers are only valid for the current session. If A replays { , }, the smart card will find that the received is not equal with computed Security and Communication Networks 9 based on its secret. Similarly, if A replays { }, S will find that ̸ = . The protocol finally aborts.
Desynchronization Attack.
Desynchronization attack denotes that the adversary modifies the parameters of a message or simply blocks the message causing that the legitimate user cannot access the server anymore.
In our scheme, all the messages are generated based on the authentication value and the random number 1 or 2 . The user and the server check the validity of each message they receive. If the adversary A modifies the parameters of a message, the receiver will detect the message is tampered with and reject it. Besides, if A blocks a message, it just leads to the single authentication failure for the current session, but it does not alter the parameters that the user and the server have. The user is able to continue to access the server.
User Anonymity.
In our scheme, is protected by symmetric encryption under the key . The adversary A cannot retrieve , unless he gets the private key of S. Furthermore, the cipher text of changes with random number 1 in each session. Our scheme also achieves user identity untraceability.
User Impersonation
, , } from the stolen smart card and intercepts the transmitted messages between and S from public channel. Then A tries to forge a login request { , } to defraud S. A generates a random number and computes = 1 , = 1
. To compute , is required. However, is protected by hash function. The only way to obtain is to retrieve from . As * = ⊕ * , * = ℎ( * ⊕ ), the adversary needs to get firstly. But as analyzed in "offline password guessing attack", the adversary is unable to get in the case that smart card is compromised. Eventually, the adversary cannot forge a valid login request. Our scheme is immune to user impersonation attack. 6.1.6. Server Impersonation Attack. Provided that A gets { , , (⋅), , , , , } and the transmitted messages between and S,A tries to impersonate the server by forging a valid message { , }, where
In order to compute , the adversary has to know . As analyzed in "user impersonation attack", the adversary is unable to obtain , even if he compromises the smart card. Without , the adversary is unable to perform server impersonation attack successfully. is known. Next, to obtain , A needs to derive ( 1 2 ) from ( 1 ), ( 2 ) . That is to say, A needs to solve the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP). Otherwise, the adversary 
A is unable to reveal SK. Hence, our scheme achieves forward secrecy.
Session Key Disclosure Attack.
A intercepts the transmitted messages between and S from public channel. Then A attempts to compromise SK. and are required to compute SK. To get , A needs to break the smart card and password of user at the same time. To get , A needs to solve the elliptic curve CDHP. Both are beyond the ability of A. Our scheme is secure against session key disclosure attack.
In our scheme, the session key includes a long-term authentication value and a temporary secret key generated by Diffie-Hellman key exchange. The long-term authentication value denotes the shared secret authentication information between S and . The temporary secret key ensures that our scheme is resistant to known key attack and achieves forward secrecy.
Formal Analysis.
We use BAN logic [38] to prove our scheme achieves mutual authentication and session key establishment. Table 2 gives the symbols and rules used in BAN logic.
The goals that our scheme should achieve are as follows. The idealized form of our scheme is given as follows.
M1:
→ < 1 , ← → > Table 3 : Results of security analysis.
Schemes
Nikooghadam [15] Luo [17] Xie [19] Amin [20] Maitra [22] Maitra [23] Islam [24] Our protocol S1 
The assumptions about the initial belief of our scheme are given as follows.
The BAN logic proof of our scheme is performed in the following steps.
According to M1, we have
Applying the message-meaning rule on S1, (1), we obtain
Applying the nonce-verification rule on S2, (2), we obtain
Applying the jurisdiction rule on S3, (3), we obtain
According to M2, we have
Applying the message-meaning rule on S4, (5), we obtain
Applying the nonce-verification rule on S5, (6), we obtain
Applying the jurisdiction rule to S6, (7) , we obtain
According to M3, we have
Applying the message-meaning rule on S1, (9), we obtain
Applying the nonce-verification rule on S7, (10), we obtain
Applying the jurisdiction rule to S8, (11), we obtain (12) | ≡ ( ← → ) Goal 4
Security and Performance Comparison
We compare the proposed scheme with other recently introduced schemes [15, 17, 19, 20, [22] [23] [24] in this section. Table 3 shows the results of security analysis. Only our scheme is resistant to various known attacks and achieves forward secrecy and user anonymity and detects the wrong password promptly, while other schemes have security loopholes more or less. We estimate the computation overheads and communication costs of related schemes concerning login and authentication phase in Table 4 . In accordance with Table 4 , the total computation overhead of our scheme is inferior to 11.1691 ms 704 bits denotes one modular exponentiation. denotes one point multiplication on elliptic curve group. denotes one symmetric encryption/decryption. denotes performing a hash function. According to [37] , the computing times of , , , are 0.0023 ms, 0.0046 ms, 2.226 ms, and 3.85 ms respectively. The computing time of lightweight operation "XOR" is negligible. To compute the communication overhead, we suppose that and random number and timestamp are 64 bits, the output of hash function and symmetric encryption are 128 bits, large-prime numbers m, p are 1024 bits, one point on the elliptic curve is 160 bits.
Amin et al. 's scheme and Nikooghadam et al. 's scheme, but it is pretty better than other schemes [17, 19, [22] [23] [24] . Furthermore, we have demonstrated that the schemes of Amin et al. and Nikooghadam et al. suffer from various vulnerabilities. In addition, our scheme has the lowest communication overhead among these schemes.
In summary, our scheme has obvious advantages in terms of security. As for computation overhead, our scheme is superior to most schemes. Besides, our scheme is ahead of other schemes in aspect of communication cost. Hence, our scheme is more practical than other schemes.
Conclusion
In this paper, we cryptanalyze two anonymous authentication schemes and pointed out they suffer from a variety of security attacks like offline password guessing attack and user impersonation attack. In addition, we reveal the security weaknesses of two environment-specific authentication schemes. To overcome the security loopholes, we present an efficient authentication scheme using elliptic curve cryptosystem. In our scheme, the security of session key is fully guaranteed. It prevents all the possible session key exposure, forward secrecy attack included. We give both formal analysis and informal analysis to prove the completeness and security of the proposed scheme. Furthermore, the outcomes of security and performance comparison show that the proposed scheme is superior with better security and low computation and communication cost. Besides, the proposed scheme has good expansibility. In the future, we plan to design an efficient biometrics-based remote user authentication scheme for multiserver environment based on our current work.
